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Abstract 
This  paper  discusses  the  possible  effects  of  various  ways  of  charging  for  water  in  an 
integrated modeling framework adapted to the Drâa River Basin in southeastern Morocco. 
Declining surface water availability in the basin has led to an increase in groundwater use for 
irrigation in recent decades, even though groundwater extraction is more costly than using 
surface water. The trade-off between the pricing of ground and surface water is discussed 
based  on  recursive-dynamic  simulations  over  a  ten-year  period.  The  results  identify 
groundwater pricing as an economically and environmentally favorable option, assuming that 
revenues from water charges are redistributed to farmers.  
Keywords: River basin model; Water pricing; Water management; Conjunctive water use; 
Morocco 
Cet article traite de l’impact des stratégies alternatives de la tarification de l’eau dans le 
cadre d’une modélisation intégrée, adaptée au bassin du Drâa, dans le sud-est du Maroc. 
Lors  des  dernières  décennies,  une  baisse  du  niveau  des  eaux  de  surface  a  entraîné  une 
augmentation  de  l’utilisation  des  eaux  souterraines  destinée  à  l’irrigation  bien  que 
l’extraction de ces eaux soit plus onéreuse que l’utilisation des eaux de surface. On discute le 
compromis  entre  la  tarification  des  eaux  de  surface  et  celle  des  eaux  souterraines  en  se 
basant sur des simulations dynamiques récursives sur une période de dix ans. Les résultats 
identifient l’option favorable tant au niveau économique qu’environnemental que représente 
la tarification des eaux souterraines, à condition de redistribuer aux agriculteurs les revenus 
issus des tarifs de l’eau. 
Mots-clés : Modèle de bassin versant ; Tarification de l’eau ; Gestion des eaux ; Utilisation 
conjonctive de l’eau ; Maroc 
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1. Introduction 
The Middle Drâa Valley in southeast Morocco is a typical example of an arid river basin 
where surface water and groundwater resources are hydraulically interconnected. The use of 
both  water  resource  types  by  farmers  for  irrigation  purposes  is  known  as  a  ‘conjunctive 
system’ (Gemma & Tsur, 2007: 540), which is typical for river basins in arid regions where 
groundwater is used as a complementary source during periods when surface water is scarce. 
The  inter-temporal  management  of  conjunctive  water  resources  has  been  addressed  by 
numerous  authors  since  the  1960s.  Buras  (1963),  Burt  (1964)  and  Bredehoft  and  Young 
(1970)  were  among  the  first  to  simulate  such  systems  with  dynamic  linear  programming 
models that yielded optimal water extraction and allocation plans over multiple locations and 
periods. The theoretical background of conjunctive water use with a focus on the role of 
groundwater aquifers as buffers was elaborated by Bear and Levin (1970) and Gisser and 
Mercado (1973), and later refined by Tsur and Graham-Tomasi (1991) and most recently by 
Gemma and Tsur (2007).  
The authors demonstrate the existence of a steady-state in which groundwater recharge and 
use are in equilibrium under different assumptions, and identify the stock or buffer value of 
the groundwater resource. To arrive at optimal water use plans, quantitative restrictions such 
as quotas or the taxation of groundwater use are suggested (e.g. Noel et al., 1980), with water 
pricing  often  oriented  at  the  shadow  values  of  water  use.  Applying  this  principle  proves 
difficult when taking the spatial and temporal peculiarities of hydrological flow processes into 
account in more detail. Pongkijvorasin and Roumasset (2007) arrive at different prices for 
farmers according to their location along a river when calculating efficiency prices for ground 
and surface water based on the distance between the demand sites.  
It is widely accepted among resource economists that effective pricing of irrigation water 
supports  efficient  allocation  and  conservation  of  resources  (Dinar  &  Subramanian,  1997). 
Charging for water is a common practice in most river basins in Morocco, even though price 
levels  are  primarily  aimed  at  recovering  the  costs  of  water  supply,  while  efficiency  or 
resource preservation considerations are less important (Tsur et al., 2001). In the Drâa Valley, 
it has so far been possible to avoid charging for either surface or groundwater (Serghini, 2002; 
Doukkali, 2005), mostly because the region is one of the poorest and most remote in the 
country. This paper discusses simplified irrigation water pricing strategies for the Drâa Valley 
in a recursive-dynamic framework. Two key assumptions are that a) farmers can extract water 
from different but interconnected sources, namely surface water from the Drâa River and 
groundwater  from  local  aquifers,  and  that  b)  neither  farmers  nor  the  water  management 
agency take long-term expectations of future water supply into consideration.  
As  the  Drâa  Valley  is  characterized  by  highly  volatile  surface  water  supply  conditions, 
optimal multi-annual water use plans or water charges are difficult to identify. Moreover, 
given the frequent droughts in the region, ‘optimal’ use rights or price levels derived from a 
fully dynamic simulation model would probably seem too restrictive to farming communities 
to  be  politically  acceptable.  Thus,  rather  than  working  out  an  optimal  inter-annual  water 
management regime, this paper investigates whether simplified water pricing systems might 
still be better than the current water management system in the study area over a period of ten 
years. The study in particular focuses on a  comparison between surface and groundwater 
pricing  regimes.  Cornish  et  al.  (2004)  discuss  different  experiences  of  surface  and 
groundwater pricing, and point out that increasing charges for surface water only could lead to 
groundwater being overexploited. This paper thus tries to answer two questions: is there a 
trade-off between simplified surface versus groundwater pricing schemes, and what role does 
the conjunctive nature of the water resources play in this context? AfJARE Vol 2 No 2 September 2008                                                           Claudia Heidecke, Arnim Kuhn and Stephan Klose 
  172 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: we first describe the study area and its 
hydrologic  and  hydro-geologic  setting.  Then  we  explain  the  simulation  model  used,  after 
which we show the results for different pricing options for the Drâa Valley.  
 
2. Water resources in the Middle Drâa Valley 
Most farm production in the Middle Drâa Valley (i.e. downstream from the Mansour Eddahbi 
reservoir) is found in six oases along the course of the Drâa River (Figure 1). Because of the 
arid climatic conditions in the area, irrigation water is the most important production resource 












Figure 1: The six oases Mezguita (O1), Tinzouline (O2), Ternata (O3), Fezouata (O4), Ktaoua 
(O5) and Mhamid (O6)  along the Drâa River  
Decisions about the distribution of surface water among the six oases are made ex ante at the 
basin  level  by  a  committee  at  the  beginning  of  the  agricultural  year  (ORMVAO,  1995). 
Surface water for irrigation is periodically released from the Mansour Eddahbi reservoir to 
improve the reliability of the water supply. Released water is directed to the southern oases 
first  and  then  retained  in  small  local  reservoirs.  From  there,  water  is  directed  through  a 
traditional channel system onto the fields and distributed according to traditional local water 
property rights (Ouhajou, 1996).  
Because of declining rainfalls in recent years and high evapotranspiration rates, the fill rate of 
the Mansour Eddahbi reservoir has been decreasing (see Figure 2). The reservoir balance has 
become  increasingly  negative,  which  has  led  to  more  and  more  irregular  releases  during 
recent years. Nowadays the releases of the reservoir are sometimes used just to fill up the 
declining groundwater levels, exploiting the fact that water easily infiltrates into the shallow 
aquifers below the riverbed.  AfJARE Vol 2 No 2 September 2008                                                           Claudia Heidecke, Arnim Kuhn and Stephan Klose 






































Source: Direction Générale de l’Hydrologie, Rabat, 2004 
Figure 2: Water balance of the Mansour Eddahbi reservoir from 1972/73 to 2002/03 
 
In contrast to decisions about surface water, decisions about groundwater pumping are made 
by  individual  farmers  who  own  pumps.  It  is  assumed  that  each  of  the  six  oases  has  an 
underlying aquifer with specific hydro-geological characteristics (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Total area and natural reserves of the aquifers of the oases 
  Mezguita  Tinzouline  Ternata  Fezouata  Ktaoua  M’hamid 
Total area of the aquifers (km
2)  45  69  178  196  160  70 
Total natural reserves (Mio m³)  22.5  34.5  71.3 127.1  86.4 16.8 
Source: Ouhajou, 1996, own calculations 
 
As compared to the total storage volume of the Mansour Eddahbi reservoir (439 million cubic 
meters in 1998, down from the initial 560 million cubic meters in 1972 due to sedimentation, 
see Abou-Otmane, 2002), the total natural reserves of groundwater are estimated to represent 
359 million cubic meters of water storage capacity (Table 1), meaning that almost half of the 
total  water  storage  capacity  of  the  Drâa  Valley  is  contained  in  groundwater  aquifers. 
However,  declining  rainfall  reduces  the  pluvial  aquifer  recharge  as  well  as  the  lateral 
groundwater  afflux  (Aoubouazza  &  Meknassi,  1996;  Direction  de  la  Région  Hydraulique 
d’Agadir  de  Souss-Massa  et  Drâa,  2001).  The  general  hydrographic  trend  in  fact  reveals 
declining  average  groundwater levels since 1996. At the same time the number of motor 
pumps has increased remarkably during the last 30 years (see Table 2). Figures on the number 
of motor pumps are only available to 1985, which illustrates the problem that groundwater use 
is insufficiently monitored. Survey data for 2005 suggest that the number of motor pumps has 
increased tremendously in the last two decades. Basin-wide water management faces a typical AfJARE Vol 2 No 2 September 2008                                                           Claudia Heidecke, Arnim Kuhn and Stephan Klose 
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conflict between long-term resource conservation goals for the entire basin and short-term 
income considerations for individual farmers. 
 
Table 2: Development of motor pumps and pumping capacity 
Number of motor pumps   
1977  1982  1985 
Water pumped 









Mezguita  216  260  860  4.64  0.08  1.85 
Tinzouline  499  590  1200  6.48  0.17  1.76 
Ternata  785  920  1500  8.10  0.22  1.48 
Fezouata  383  448  710  3.83  0.16  1.30 
Ktaoua  108  130  220  1.19  0.04  0.35 
M’hamid  10  15  30  0.16  0.01  0.53 
Source: Faouzi, 1986, own estimations from field survey in 2005 
 
3. The MIVAD River Basin model 
This study uses a numerical simulation model
1 based on positive mathematical programming 
(PMP, Howitt, 1995) to compare alternative water pricing options for the Drâa Basin. There 
are  several  reasons  for  this  rather  normative  approach.  Most  importantly,  basin-wide 
information on water use at the farm level is scarcely available in the case study region. This 
applies particularly to the use of groundwater. Moreover, the impact of cost changes on water 
use patterns cannot be estimated ex post as costs of water use are not documented over the 
years, and because charging for water has not yet been tried in the case study area. Thus, the 
pricing experiments presented in this study are in effect ex ante evaluations of programming 
models to decide which ones are suitable for situations where observed data on important 
variables are scarce or even absent. Finally, programming models allow the derivation of 
water shadow prices at different locations and periods, thereby delivering a point of reference 
for administrative water price levels. 
Mathematical programming approaches have been widely applied to water resources issues, 
especially in those cases where the insufficient availability of data means that econometric 
estimations are not possible. The simulation model MIVAD (Modèle Intégré de la Vallée du 
Drâa) is designed as a hydrologic-economic optimization model in which spatial relations are 
represented  in  a  node  network  representing  points  of  withdrawal  along  the  river,  water 
reservoirs,  groundwater  bodies  and  agricultural  water  demand  sites.  As  such,  MIVAD  is 
similar to models that have been recently applied by Cai (1999) to the Syr Darya Basin, by 
Rosegrant et al. (2000) to the Maipo Basin in Chile, by Ringler (2002) to the Mekong Basin, 
and by Obeng-Asiedu (2004) to the Volta River Basin. However, these modeling approaches 
simulate one aquifer per demand site where the aquifers are not interconnected with each 
other (Cai et al., 2006). In the Drâa Valley the aquifers that are situated below the belt of 
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oases  are  hydraulically  interconnected,  which  has  been  taken  into  account  in  the  present 
modeling approach. 
Basically, MIVAD is a planning model that maximizes the net agricultural revenues of the six 
farming communities (oases) subject to land and water resource constraints. Agriculture is 
represented by one aggregate farm per oasis, involving the eight most relevant crops in the 
area: wheat, barley, alfalfa, corn, date palms, henna, pulses and an aggregate of vegetables. 
All cropping activities are characterized by specific input needs, yield functions, prices and 
water requirements. The parameters of the PMP-terms in the objective function are calibrated 
using a priori supply elasticities (Heckelei & Wolff, 2003), which are principally different for 
annual and perennial crops. Endogenous crop yield functions in the model are designed as 
non-linear  approximations  of  the  ratio  between  actual  and  maximum  evapotranspiration 
according to the Modified Penman function (FAO, 1998), making crop yields a function of 
water application per hectare. 
Available cropland is specific to the oasis (farm community) level. Water resources available 
to the oases, by contrast, are represented by a highly complex hydrological system which is 
assumed to be governed by a centralized water distribution agency. This ‘virtual planner’ 
distributes irrigation water to the various oases and municipal users in order to maximize the 
utility from water use for the entire region.  
 
3.1 The hydrologic framework in MIVAD 
The hydrological modeling network of the Drâa River Basin actually starts with the river node 
that defines the exogenous monthly inflows into the Mansour Eddahbi reservoir from the 
High Atlas Mountains. From the reservoir, water is released to the Drâa River and flows 
downstream, partly infiltrating and percolating to the alluvial aquifers subjacent to each oasis. 
For each of these aquifers a specifically adjusted groundwater balance is part of the model. 
In the Drâa Valley, however, aquifers are not closed entities, but interconnected by discharges 
in the same direction as the river flow. The relatively small flow sections between the aquifers 
are limited by non-pervious rock formations at the lower end of each oasis. Groundwater 
discharge is calculated as 1-D flow by the Darcy equation (Darcy, 1856) which depends on 
the hydraulic conductivity of the alluvial deposits, the flow section and hydraulic gradients 
between the aquifers. In case of very high groundwater levels, a discharge into the river bed 
may occur too, but this process is less important under the current dry conditions in the Drâa 
Valley.  
Lateral inflows from rain water infiltrating the catchment area of each aquifer also contribute 
to  groundwater  recharge,  but  have  played  only  a  minor  role  in  most  years.  By  contrast, 
infiltration  from  the  river  bed  into  the  aquifers  appears  to  be  a  decisive  factor  for  the 
groundwater balance in the case study region. It is also an important element of groundwater 
management  by  the  authorities,  who  occasionally  use  reservoir  releases  to  replenish  the 
groundwater bodies in the river basin. The coefficient for the groundwater recharge by river 
water infiltration has proved to be a pivotal factor in hydro-geological models (Simmers, 
1997). First estimations of the recharge coefficient for the Drâa Valley yield values between 
10 and 25% of the river water flow.  
The interactions between ground and surface water resources in the model are illustrated in 
Figure 3. A hydrological balance is formulated for each river node in the model.  AfJARE Vol 2 No 2 September 2008                                                           Claudia Heidecke, Arnim Kuhn and Stephan Klose 













































Figure 3: Hydrologic interactions in MIVAD 
3.2 Determination of decision variables 
There are several levels in MIVAD at which decisions on land and water use are made to 
arrive  at  an  optimal  distributional  pattern  that  maximizes  the  sum  of  agricultural  gross 
margins.  Decision  variables  include  crop  areas  in  the  individual  oases  (Ai),  and  various 
variables related to water use: seasonal water application per crop measured in terms of crop 
evapotranspiration (ETAi), water withdrawals by oases from the river (W
S) or the underlying 
groundwater  body  (W
G),  the  fill levels  of  the  groundwater  aquifers  (R
G),  the  downstream 
flows  between  river  nodes  (F
S),  and  fill  levels  (R
R)  and  releases  (F
R)  from  the  central 
reservoir. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for local optima that determine the levels of these 
decision variables are discussed in the following. Indices denote available cropping activities 
(i), locations such as river nodes, aquifers and oases (f), and months (t) within a one-year 
period. 
The first-order condition of the objective function with respect to crop area (Ai) is represented 
by the following non-linear relation between marginal costs (MCi) and marginal revenues 
(MRi) from cropping: 
( ) , , , ,            0
L A A L L
i i t i t i i i i i
t
MC W MR P Y AC A A l l
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
× ³ × ^ ³ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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(W
A  =  application  of  irrigation  water  per  hectare;  ￿
A  =  shadow  price  of  water  for  crop 
irrigation; ￿
L = shadow price of cropland; Pi, Yi, ACi, = crop prices, yields, and accounting 
costs, respectively) 
The complementarity between the MC-MR-difference and the quantitative decision variable 
is denoted by the ‘^’-sign. Water application per crop (W
A) itself is a function of seasonal 
evapotranspiration per crop (ETAi), which ultimately determines crop yields (Yi), but also of 
the local irrigation and groundwater shadow prices: 
( ) ( ) , , , , , , , , , , ,         0
irrig seas stage G A irrig seas stage max seas seas
i i i t i t t i i i t i i i i i MC ETA ETM A MR ETA ETM Y ky A P ETA l l ³ ^ ³  
(ETMi
stage = yield-max. monthly evapotranspiration; ￿
G = shadow price groundwater; Yi
max = 
maximum crop yield; kyi
seas = seasonal crop water deficit coefficient) 
Surface water for irrigation depends on releases from the upstream reservoir. The reservoir 
has a limited storage capacity and, assuming that the periodic inflows of river water into the 
reservoir are known ex ante within a one-year horizon, the monthly fill levels (R
R) are chosen 
such that the shadow prices of reservoir water (￿
R) are equal over all periods t.  
1      0
R R R
t t t R l l + ³ ^ ³  
Releases from the reservoir (F
R) occur when the shadow price in the reservoir (￿
R) is equal to 
or lower than the shadow price at the adjacent river node (￿
S): 
      0
R S R
t t t F l l ³ ^ ³  
Similarly, when the shadow price of water at the river node upstream is equal to the river 
node downstream, a river flow (F
S
f,f+1) should occur between these nodes. If, however, there 
are infiltration losses (infil
SG) of river water into the local aquifers, the decision rule becomes 
more complex, involving also the shadow price for groundwater in the aquifer belonging to 
the  downstream  river  node  (￿
G).  Increasing  river-aquifer  infiltration  will,  ceteris  paribus, 
decrease the incentive to let water flow downstream, particularly as long as ￿
G is low or zero, 
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As  water  for  irrigation  also  infiltrates  into  the  local  aquifers,  the  shadow  price  relation 
governing withdrawals by oases from river nodes (W
S) is also quite complex, involving the 
shadow price at the river node (￿
S), and the shadow price of irrigation water in the oasis (￿
A), 
but also groundwater shadow prices, the shadow price of the surface water distribution rules 
(￿
distr), and financial costs (including charges) of surface water withdrawals (c
S). Thus, losses 
within the canal system of the oases mean that water becomes more costly for farmers, an 
effect  that  will  be  dampened,  however,  as  soon  as  groundwater  becomes  scarce  and  its 
shadow price positive. AfJARE Vol 2 No 2 September 2008                                                           Claudia Heidecke, Arnim Kuhn and Stephan Klose 
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,         0
S
f t W ^ ³
(with  loss
SG  =  coefficient  determining  the  infiltration  losses  occurring  at  surface  water 
withdrawals by oases) 
Groundwater pumping (W
G) is determined in a simpler way, as groundwater use is not subject 
to distribution rules or infiltration losses. The local irrigation water shadow price has to be 




Costs / charges of
groundwater use
, , ,           0
G G A G
f t f f t f t c W l l + ³ ^ ³  
Analogous to water in the reservoir, the fill level of the aquifer is determined by the inter-
temporal  relation  between  shadow  prices  of  groundwater  in  the  aquifer,  but  also  by  the 
shadow price in the river node (in the case of discharge into the river)
2 and the shadow price 
in the downstream aquifer (due to inter-aquifer flows as represented by the Darcy equation, 
which renders the shadow price relation as non-linear in R
G)
3. Increasing inter-aquifer flows 
would thus decrease the socially optimal aquifer fill levels and reward more local pumping. 
Costs of groundwater outflow  Value of Intertemporal difference
to the downstream aquifer of GW shadow prices in f
, , 1 , , 1, 1, , 1, ,
G G G G G G G G
f t f t f t f t f t f t f t f t darcy R R darcy R R l l l l + + + + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - - × + × - ­ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
( )
￿
 groundwater outflow 
to the downstream aquifer
Fill level 
of aquifer
, 1, , , 1 ,
0
             0
G G G G G
f t f t f t f t f t darcy R l l l l + +
³
« + - × ³ ^ ³
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
 
All  shadow  prices  in  the  model  are  complementary  to  the  hydrologic  balances  at  certain 
locations. The entire shadow price system is finally driven by the irrigation water shadow 
price l
A, as the use of water for irrigation is the only use component that enters the objective 
function in the version of MIVAD presented here. l
A thus represents the opportunity costs of 
water use for farmers, and is dependent on the marginal value productivity of irrigation water. 
The opportunity costs of water are also a yardstick for the willingness of farmers to incur 
costs  for  obtaining  access  to  irrigation  water  resources.  The  complex  hydraulic  relations 
between the local water sources, however, can lead to large differences in local irrigation 
water shadow prices. Water pricing that is oriented at simulated marginal water costs becomes 
politically  delicate  under  such  conditions,
4  particularly  when  the  parameters  of  hydraulic 
interactions are uncertain. Moreover, the model assumes that expectations about future water 
supply – which would be useful for determining optimal inter-annual water price levels – are 
not taken into account by the water distribution agency. The fact that depleted water buffers in 
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reservoirs and aquifers can actually be found in the case study region after a series of dry 
years supports this assumption. The simulations carried out for this study test to what extent 
simplified pricing schemes that do not require a multi-annual perspective will nevertheless 
lead to better results than no charge at all for water. 
 
4. Simulations of pricing options 
The  following  results  show  scenario  calculations  for  a  ten-year  period,  simulating  an 
increasingly  severe  drought  and  farmers’  adaptation  under  different  pricing  regimes  for 
irrigation water. In the base run (Figure 4) we assume the first year to be a ‘normal’ year with 
average rainfall. Surface water availability is simulated to become scarcer each year with a 
decrease of 6.5% annually, arriving at 12% of the surface water initially available at the end 
of the ten-year period. Fixed non-irrigation water demand is assumed to increase exogenously 
at 3.1% annually for urban and 0.8% for rural areas due to population growth. We assume a 
15% rate of groundwater recharge by river water infiltration of flows at each river node per 
month. Calculations based on a farm survey estimate variable costs of pumping groundwater 
for  irrigation  purposes  at  0.58  Moroccan  Dirham  (MDH)  per  cubic  meter  (cbm) 
(approximately 7 US cents/cbm in May 2007, see Heidecke & Kuhn, 2006) including fuel as 
well as operation and maintenance costs. The base run (Figure 4) assumes that neither ground 
nor surface water is charged for. Nevertheless, groundwater use is less attractive because of 

















































Shadow irrig. water price (MDH/cbm) Agric. river water use (mio cbm)
Agric. groundwater use (mio cbm) Total agric. water use (mio cbm)
Agric. net revenues total (mio MDH) Use of available crop area (%)
 
Figure 4: Base run (assuming declining river water availability and variable costs for pumping 
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The  declining  availability  of  surface  water  in  the  base  run  leads  to  the  use  of  more 
groundwater for irrigation. After two years the extraction of groundwater reaches 140 million 
cubic meters per year and slightly declines afterwards when aquifers are fully exploited and 
groundwater  shadow  prices  assume  non-zero  values.  The  average  water  shadow  price 
increases with the decreasing availability of surface water from the Drâa River. The fact that 
these  water  shadow  prices  for  irrigation  by  far  exceed  extraction  costs  indicates  that  an 
effective  resource  preservation  policy  would  have  to  consider  the  pricing  of  groundwater 
beyond  the  extraction  costs  of  0.58  MDH/cbm.  Total  net  revenues  from  agricultural 
production decrease constantly from nearly 500 million MDH to less than 200 million MDH 
during the ten-year period. 
Three counterfactual scenarios are simulated: a charge for surface water only (SWC) of 1.0 
MDH/cbm, a charge for groundwater only (GWC) of 1.0 (resulting in groundwater costs of 
1.58 MDH/cbm when also considering the extraction costs of 0.58 MDH/cbm), and a ‘total 
water  charge’  with  charges  for  both  water  resources  (TWC).  The  TWC  scenario  simply 
combines the water charges of the SWC and GWC scenarios, making groundwater still more 
expensive for farmers than surface water. To evaluate the efficiency of the different pricing 
regimes, net revenues of agricultural producers are compared to ‘total basin revenues’. These 
‘total  basin  revenues’  contain  agricultural  revenues  plus  all  revenues  from  water  charges 
which represent the taxation of farmers, but which are also available for redistribution to the 
farmers as income transfers. Such transfers are assumed to have no further allocative effects 
in the model. Total basin revenues are also discounted at 5% and 10% to account for the 
farmers’ preference for short-term incomes (Table 3).  
 
Table  3:  Results  for  the  base  run,  the  SWC,  GWC,  and  TWC  scenarios  for  several 
indicators as averages over ten years 
   Base run  SWC  GWC   TWC 
Agric. river water use (mio cbm)  123.06  117.07  151.08  137.00 
Agric. groundwater use (mio cbm)  86.03  92.91  49.36  66.32 
Irrigation water shadow price (MDH/cbm)  2.46  2.46  2.27  2.30 
Agric. net revenues total (mio MDH)  279.92  141.25  245.76  61.84 
Sum of water charges (mio MDH)  0.00  117.07  49.36  203.31 
Total basin revenues (mio MDH)  279.92  258.32  295.12  265.15 
Total basin revenues (discounted at 5%)  238.07  218.85  248.54  224.65 
Total basin revenues (discounted at 10%)  207.31  189.86  214.58  194.92 AfJARE Vol 2 No 2 September 2008                                                              Claudia Heidecke, Arnim Kuhn and Stephan Klose 
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The  three  pricing  scenarios  yield  markedly  different  results  with  respect  to  revenues  and 
resource use. Under surface water pricing, groundwater use becomes more attractive, which 
leads to higher groundwater use than in the base run, which is likely to be unsustainable. At the 
same time the basin-wide revenues (including surface water charges) are 8% lower than in the 
base run. When both water sources are charged for (TWC), groundwater water use decreases, 
but at the cost of an excessive taxation of farmers. Charging only for groundwater (GWC) 
yields the most favorable results, both with respect to resource conservation and in terms of 
total basin income. This seems counterintuitive at first sight, but when looking at the GWC 
results in more detail over the entire period (Figure 5), the higher income can be explained by 
the fact that groundwater pricing prevents wasteful groundwater use in the earlier years and 
thus eases water scarcity in the further course of the scenario. This is also reflected in the fact 

















































Shadow irrig. water price (MDH/cbm) Agric. river water use (mio cbm)
Agric. groundwater use (mio cbm) Total agric. water use (mio cbm)
Agric. net revenues total (mio MDH) Use of available crop area (%)
 
Figure 5: Scenario calculations of charging only for groundwater (GWC)  
 
With a charge for groundwater only, the total agricultural water use is more stable over the 
entire period than in the base run and in the other scenarios, resulting in a higher stability of 
farm  incomes.  When  comparing  groundwater  use  over  all  pricing  options  (Figure  6), 
groundwater use is lowest in the GWC scenario, and highest in the base run and SWC scenarios 
in  the  first  years.  This  changes  when  aquifers  are  depleted  in  the  latter  scenarios,  while AfJARE Vol 2 No 2 September 2008                                                              Claudia Heidecke, Arnim Kuhn and Stephan Klose 
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Figure 6: Groundwater use of the six oases over a ten-year period for the base run and for 
charges for ground and surface water 
 
Regarding farmers’ net revenues and the basin-wide income for the scenarios (Figure 7), the 
advantage of groundwater availability in future years has direct effects on incomes. Naturally, 
farmers’ net revenues are the highest in the base run where farmers are not charged for water at 
all; however, the GWC scenario only slightly reduces farmers’ net revenues and yields even 
higher basin-wide revenues, especially in the later years. Discounting the basin-wide revenues, 
revenues  at  the  end  of  the  simulation  period  are  of  lower  importance;  nevertheless  the 
groundwater charge remains the best option (see Table 3).  
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Base run SWC GWC TWC  
Figure 7: Net revenues and basin-wide revenues  
 
Figure 8 shows the average shadow prices in MDH/cbm for irrigation water, surface water, and 
groundwater  at  the  level  of  individual  oases  across  the  entire  simulation  period.  In  both 
scenarios the shadow prices of surface water are more or less equal across the oases due to the 
nature of surface water as a common pool resource. Small variations between the oases can be 
explained by differences due to infiltration losses and the effects of distribution rules. In the 
base run, groundwater shadow prices and hence irrigation water shadow prices increase from 
the northern oases to the southern oases. Broadly speaking, shadow price differences between 
aquifers  can  be  greater  than  those  for  surface  water,  since  groundwater  resources  are 
hydrologically more isolated. While the hydraulic connections between aquifers tend to reduce 
the differences in water scarcity, the dominant infiltration losses from river flows contribute to 
increasing  the  inter-aquifer  differences  in  water  shadow  prices.  The  groundwater  charge 
obviously reduces the variation of both groundwater and irrigation water shadow prices across 
oases. Altogether, surface and groundwater shadow prices are smaller when a water charge is 
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The  scarcity  of  surface  water  directly  affects  the  availability  of  groundwater  due  to  the 
infiltration into the river bed. To examine the economic effect of this hydrological process 
more closely, all pricing scenarios are repeated at a groundwater recharge coefficient of 10 and 
20%, respectively (Annex 1). Assuming a higher recharge coefficient of 20% instead of 15%, 
more groundwater is able to infiltrate into the river bed, making surface water even scarcer. 
The higher the natural infiltration from river to aquifer, the more favorable groundwater pricing 
appears to be compared with the other options. This also indicates that the suitability of a 
pricing scheme is sensitive to hydrological parameters and to the availability of ground and 
surface water.  
 
4. Conclusions 
Charging  for  water  has  so  far  been  avoided  in  the  Drâa  Valley  as  farmers’  incomes  were 
deemed too low to pay for additional water charges. However, the obvious overexploitation of 
groundwater resources in recent years indicates that the current patterns of water use will not be 
sustainable in the long run, particularly if the average surface water availability is bound to 
worsen in the course of population growth and climate change. This paper discusses charges for 
irrigation  water  as  an  option  for  regional  river  basin  water  management,  focusing  on 
groundwater conservation and income stabilization as primary goals.  
The  comparison  of  water  pricing  regimes  for  the  Drâa  Valley  in  Morocco  shows  that 
groundwater  charges,  in  contrast  to  surface  water  charges,  lead  to  the  highest  basin-wide 
incomes, and are at the same time more effective in terms of groundwater preservation. This is 
because the buffer function of groundwater resources, i.e. using groundwater stocks to mitigate 
water scarcity in future years (Tsur & Graham-Tomasi, 1991), can be better exploited when 
groundwater  overuse  in  years  with  less  overall  water  scarcity  is  avoided  through  taxation. 
Charging for groundwater thus emulates the allocative effect of realistic future expectations of 
water supply and replaces an explicit accounting for the buffer value of groundwater stocks to 
some degree.  
Even though a considerable amount of surface water can also be stored in the reservoir, which 
thus also functions as a buffer, charging for surface water leads to an overuse of groundwater 
when surface water is still sufficiently available. When surface water becomes scarce in the 
later years, groundwater resources are already exploited under the special water availability 
scenarios used in this study. It is also likely that the existing distribution rules for surface water 
restrict efficient allocation by the central planner, which increases the value of the locally and 
temporally  more  flexible  groundwater  resources.  Enforcing  a  tax  as  a  replacement  for 
considering a buffer value is thus much less effective in the case of surface water. A sensitivity 
analysis of the natural rate of surface water infiltration into groundwater aquifers does not alter 
these conclusions. 
A water pricing system should be designed to induce efficient use of irrigation water, to avoid 
taxing farmers excessively, to be acceptable to farmers with respect to the levels and inter-
annual stability of water charges, and to contribute to long-term resource conservation goals, 
particularly  with  respect  to  groundwater.  The  results  of  the  simulations  suggest  that  a 
groundwater pricing scheme is the alternative that best meets these requirements, except for the 
issue of administrative costs, which are probably much higher for groundwater than for surface AfJARE Vol 2 No 2 September 2008                                                              Claudia Heidecke, Arnim Kuhn and Stephan Klose 
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water. However, the estimated benefits of charging for groundwater might outweigh its higher 
administrative costs, particularly since a charge for groundwater appears to create much less 
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Annex  1:  Sensitivity  analysis:  recharge  coefficient  of  10%,  15%  and  20%  across  all 
pricing scenarios  
10% recharge   Base run  SWC  GWC  TWC  
Agric. river water use (mio cbm)  139.56  135.22  155.54  153.09 
Agric. groundwater use (mio cbm)  66.80  71.01  42.35  46.55 
Consumption water use (mio cbm)  5.94  5.94  5.94  5.94 
Total agric. water use (mio cbm)  206.36  206.23  197.89  199.64 
Reservoir fill rate in %  0.31  0.34  0.31  0.31 
Agric. net revenues total (mio MDH)  289.74  127.26  252.52  66.28 
Basin revenues total (mio MDH)  289.74  262.48  294.86  266.30 
Use of available crop area (%)  66.50  68.93  58.50  68.41 
Shadow irrig. water price (MDH/cbm)  2.47  2.46  2.34  2.58 
Total basin revenues (discounted at 5%)  246.04  222.59  249.37  225.50 
Total basin revenues (discounted at 10%)  213.96  193.21  216.03  195.46 
15% recharge   Base run  SWC  GWC  TWC  
Agric. river water use (mio cbm)  123.06  117.07  151.08  137.00 
Agric. groundwater use (mio cbm)  86.03  92.91  49.36  66.32 
Consumption water use (mio cbm)  5.94  5.94  5.94  5.94 
Total agric. water use (mio cbm)  209.09  209.98  200.43  203.31 
Reservoir fill rate in %  0.31  0.33  0.31  0.31 
Agric. net revenues total (mio MDH)  279.92  141.25  245.76  61.84 
Basin revenues total (mio MDH)  279.92  258.32  295.12  265.15 
Use of available crop area (%)  65.94  69.69  58.96  60.60 
Shadow irrig. water price (MDH/cbm)  2.46  2.46  2.27  2.30 
Total basin revenues (discounted at 5%)  238.07  218.85  248.54  224.65 
Total basin revenues (discounted at 10%)  207.31  189.86  214.58  194.92 
20% recharge   Base run  SWC  GWC  TWC  
Agric. river water use (mio cbm)  111.82  101.60  147.75  132.93 
Agric. groundwater use (mio cbm)  99.07  111.06  51.91  69.48 
Consumption water use (mio cbm)  5.94  5.94  5.94  5.94 
Total agric. water use (mio cbm)  210.89  212.67  199.66  202.41 
Reservoir fill rate in %  0.31  0.33  0.31  0.31 
Agric. net revenues total (mio MDH)  271.45  149.84  239.85  60.17 
Basin revenues total (mio MDH)  271.45  251.44  291.76  262.58 
Use of available crop area (%)  66.62  69.19  57.89  60.39 
Shadow irrig. water price (MDH/cbm)  2.52  2.48  2.26  2.33 
Total basin revenues (discounted at 5 %)  231.56  213.23  245.98  222.80 
Total basin revenues (discounted at 10 %)  202.21  185.16  212.56  193.49 
 